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THE EMERGING LESSONS OF TRUMP V. HAWAII 
Shalini Bhargava Ray 
In the years since the Supreme Court decided Trump v. Hawaii,1 federal district 
courts have adjudicated dozens of rights-based challenges to executive action in 
immigration law.2 Plaintiffs, including U.S. citizens, civil rights organizations, and 
immigrants themselves, have alleged violations of the First Amendment and the equal 
protection component of the Due Process Clause with some regularity based on 
President Trump's animus toward immigrants.3 This Article assesses Hawaii's im-
pact on these challenges to immigration policy, and it offers two observations. First, 
Hawaii has amplified federal courts' practice of privileging administrative law claims 
over constitutional ones. For example, courts considering separate challenges to the 
travel ban waiver process and the mass-rescission of humanitarianparole concluded 
that plaintiffs had not stated constitutional claims under Hawaii's "circumscribed 
inquiry," but these courts remainedreceptive to plaintiffs' claims that an agency vio-
lated its obligation to provide a reasoned justification, consider reliance interests, 
explain itself sufficiently, or follow its own procedures.4 Second, Hawaii has prompted 
district courts to engage more deeply with the notion that different classes of immi-
grants are entitled to different levels of constitutional protection. This more open 
discussion ofthe contours ofimmigrants' rights acknowledges immigrants as potential 
rights-holders but ultimately exposes the limits of a rights-based approach to pro-
tecting immigrants' well-being. 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University ofAlabama School ofLaw. I am grateful to the 
William & Mary Bill ofRights Journal for inviting me to participate in its symposium on "The 
Presidency and Individual Rights." Ashley Binnetti Armstrong, Eisha Jain, and Jennifer Lee 
Koh provided valuable feedback on earlier drafts; I benefitted from a conversation aboutthis 
project with Sam Spital as well. Finally, I thank Jorge Solis (UA Law Class of 2019), Miranda 
Ronnow (UA Law Class of 2020), and Josephine Rykhus (UA Law Class of 2021) for ex-
cellent research assistance. 
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
2 See, e.g., Alharbi v. Miller, 368 F. Supp. 3d 527,540 (E.D.N.Y. 2019); Emami v. Nielsen, 
365 F. Supp. 3d 1009, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2019); NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 215-16 
(D.D.C. 2018), aff'dsub nom. Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 
S. Ct. 1891 (2020); Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 406-07 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), vacated 
sub nom. Regents, 140 S. Ct. 1891. 
' See generallyAlharbi, 368 F. Supp. 3d 527; Emami, 365 F. Supp. 3d 1009; NAACP 
v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209; Vidal, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401. 
4 See, e.g., S.A. v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
5 See, e.g., Ramos v. Nielsen (Ramos 1), 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1105, 1107 (N.D. Cal. 
2018), vacatedsub nom. Ramos v. Wolf (RamosIi), 975 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020). 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Trump Administration has altered immigration law profoundly injust a few 
years. Through Executive Orders (EOs) and Proclamations, as well as agency action, 
the administration has intensified deportations, crippled the asylum system, and cut 
legal immigration.' Immigrants and their allies have challenged these policies in 
federal court, providing a window into how the federal courts adjudicate immigrants' 
rights in numerous cases. The Supreme Court's 2018 decision in Trump v. Hawaii, 
which allowed the third version of the administration's travel ban on nationals from 
seven majority-Muslim countries to go into effect,7 offers an example of judicial 
review of executive action in immigration law. For this symposium on "The Presi-
dency and Individual Rights," I consider the implications of Trump v. Hawaii for 
rights-based challenges to executive action in immigration law. 
Immigrants have seldom succeeded onrace-based equal protection claims challeng-
ing statutes or regulations, but hese losses have often been attributed to the lack of 
evidence ofdiscriminatory intent.' In the challenges considered in this Article, how-
ever, plaintiffs alleged or provided direct evidence of discriminatory intent based on 
Trump's anti-Muslim, anti-Mexican, and anti-Black rhetoric. 9 Despite these specific 
allegations and this direct evidence, courts have been, nonetheless, exceedingly 
reluctant to acknowledge immigrants' equal protection rights.10 Instead, they have 
been much more willing to grant preliminary relief or deny motions to dismiss on 
ordinary administrative law claims." The persistence ofthis trend, despite plaintiffs' 
extensive direct evidence of discriminatory intent, calls for analysis, one that this 
Article undertakes. 
6 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 9984, 85 Fed. Reg. 6,709, 6,710 (Jan. 31,2020); Proclamation 
No. 9983, 85 Fed. Reg. 6,699, 6,703-05 (Jan. 31, 2020); Proclamation No. 9945, 84 Fed. 
Reg. 53,991, 53,992 (Oct. 4,2019); Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,161-62 
(Sept. 24, 2017). 
138 S. Ct. 2392, 2400, 2403 (2018). 
' Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights ofOthers:Legal Claims andImmigrationOutside the 
Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1735 (2010). 
9 Ibram X. Kendi, Is This the Beginning of the End ofAmerican Racism?, ATLANTIC 
(Sept. 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/the-end-of-denial/614 
194/ [https://perma.cc/4HUE-NWFV] (chronicling Donald Trump's racism). 
10 See, e.g., Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 
1915-16 (2020) (rejecting plaintiffs' equal protection challenge to the rescission of DACA). 
For a discussion offederal courts' practice of overlooking explicit bias in antidiscrimination 
cases and other areas, including immigration, see Jessica A. Clarke, ExplicitBias, 113 Nw. 
U. L. REV. 505, 510 (2018). 
" SeeRegents, 140 S. Ct. at 1915 (determining that DHS's rescission ofDACA was arbi-
trary and capricious). For a discussion of the relative success of ordinary administrative law 
claims over equal protection claims brought by noncitizens prior to Hawaii, see Geoffrey 
Heeren, PersonsWho Are Not the People:The ChangingRights oflmmigrantsin the United 
States, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 367, 398 (2013). 
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This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains the 2017 travel bans and the 
Supreme Court's decision in 2018 allowing a version of the travel ban to go into 
effect. It also lays out the standard of review under the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA). Part II explores how the federal district courts have applied Trump v. 
Hawaii in a range of cases, from the ongoing travel ban litigation to challenges to 
the termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and the rescission of humani-
tarian parole. Part III offers a few thoughts on the emerging lessons of Hawaii for 
immigrants' rights litigation generally. 
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS OF TRUMP V. HA WAII AND THE APA 
Congress has plenary power to regulate the grounds for admission into and 
removal from the United States, but the President's role in immigration law has 
garnered increasing attention in recent years.13 Since its earliest days, the Trump 
Administration has worked to restrict all forms of immigration, legal and extralegal, 
whether through family, employment, or humanitarian channels. 4 Its use of execu-
tive orders and proclamations have struck commentators as "unorthodox."" Because 
the President is not an agency, his actions are not "final agency action" reviewable 
under the APA. 16 But the administration has frequently implemented its policies 
through agency action. Accordingly, this Part discusses the legal framework articu-
lated in Trump v. Hawaiias well as the APA's framework for reviewing ordinary 
administrative law claims. 
A. Trump v. Hawaii 
Litigation over the 2017 travel bans culminated in the Supreme Court's decision 
in Trump v. Hawaii.17 As discussed in this Article, the "travel ban" refers to the series 
of entry bans issued beginning just after the inauguration," which barred entry of 
foreign nationals initially from several majority-Muslim countries and then later 
North Korea and Venezuela as well." Trump's relentless campaign against Muslim 
12 Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 599-600 (1889). 
13 Seegenerally Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The PresidentandImmigration 
Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458 (2009). 
14 Seegenerally,e.g., id; Sarah Pierce& Jessica Bolter, Dismantling andReconstructing 
the US. ImmigrationSystem: A CatalogofChanges Under the Trump Presidency,MIGRATION 
POL'Y INST. 1 (July 2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications 
/MPI_US-Immigration-Trump-Presidency-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2N26-QPTW]. 
1 Michele Waslin, The Use ofExecutive OrdersandProclamationsto CreateImmigration 
Policy: Trump in HistoricalPerspective,8 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 54, 54 (2020). 
16 Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992). For a critique of Franklin,see 
Kathryn E. Kovacs, Constrainingthe StatutoryPresident, 98 WASH. U. L. REv. 63, 68 (2020). 
7 See generally 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
8 See Franklin,505 U.S. at 796. 
19 The administration subsequently issued numerous other entry bans including bans 
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immigration led to the "Muslim ban" moniker.20 The bans separated families21 and 
prevented universities from welcoming students and researchers from banned 
countries.22 Plaintiffs argued that the President had exceeded his statutory authority 
to ban entry of foreign nationals and violated the Establishment Clause by enacting 
a law designed to express disapproval of Muslims.23 Although plaintiffs succeeded 
early on, a divided Supreme Court ultimately allowed a revised version ofthe ban 
to take effect.24 
In Hawaii, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on 
their statutory and constitutional challenges to the third iteration ofthe travel ban.25 
The third iteration of the ban, framed as a Presidential Proclamation, barred travel 
from seven majority-Muslim countries as well as North Korea and Venezuela. 26 It 
provided for a waiver procedure in individual cases. 27 It imposed the ban indefi-
nitely.28 The administration claimed that the ban was designed to enhance national 
security, but plaintiffs and the national security community questioned the sincerity 
of that purpose.29 
In Hawaii,the Court analyzed only the third version of the travel ban. It first 
determined that INA section 212(f) authorized the President to broadly restrict 
entry.30 INA section 212(f) states: 
Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of 
any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental 
to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and 
for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend theentry of 
all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, 
relating to health insurance and travel from China amid the COVID-19 pandemic. See Procla-
mation No. 9945, 84 Fed. Reg. 53,991, 53,991-92 (Oct. 4, 2019); Proclamation No. 9984, 
85 Fed. Reg. 6,709, 6,710 (Jan. 31, 2020). 
20 David J. Bier, A Dozen Times Trump EquatedHis Travel Ban with a Muslim Ban, 
CATO INST. (Aug. 14, 2017, 12:06 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/dozen-times-trump 
-equated-travel-ban-muslim-ban [https://perma.cc/4AFD-NSFD]. 
21 Aidan Gardiner, IranianFamiliesDividedby the Trump TravelBan Tell ofHolidays 
ApartandLiveson Hold,N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/20 
/reader-center/trump travel ban.html [https://perma.cc/M6BA-D4RE]. 
22 Mary O'Hara, The U.S. Travel Ban Would Be BadNews for American Universities, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2017, 2:15 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/education/2017/feb/21 
/donald-trump-travel-ban-universities-intemational-students [https://perma.cc/N5AN-CHXC]. 
23 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2406 (2018) (describing plaintiffs' claims). 
24 Id. at 2423. 
25 Id 
26 Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,164 (Sept. 24, 2017). 
27 See, e.g., id at 45,168. 
28 Id. at 45,171. 
29 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2417 (describing plaintiffs' claims). 
30 Id. at 2408. 
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or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to 
be appropriate. 31 
The Court further determined that, under a standard akin to rational basis review, 
and on the limited record before the Court, there was likely no Establishment Clause 
violation. Specifically, the Court rejected traditional Establishment Clause analysis 
that inquires whether the challenged enactment has the "principal or primary effect 
of promoting religion . . . [or] if a reasonable, objective observer would view its 
purpose as one of endorsing religion."3 2 Under that analysis, plaintiffs would need 
only show that a reasonable observer would regard the purpose ofthe travel ban as 
showing disapproval of Islam.33 
Instead, the Supreme Court determined that a 1972 case, Kleindienstv. Mandel,3 4 
offered the appropriate analytic approach to the question ofthe travel ban's probable 
constitutionality. 5 In Mandel,plaintiffs were U.S. universities which sought to bring 
a Belgian professor, Ernest Mandel, to the U.S. to address university audiences. 36 
Unbeknownst o Mandel, on his previous U.S. visits, the State Department had found 
him "inadmissible," but the Attorney General had waived his inadmissibility.37 This 
time, however, the Attorney General declined to waive his inadmissibility, and Mandel 
was excluded, prompting the litigation.38 The Court addressed for the first time the 
appropriate analytic approach tojudicial review of executive exclusion decisions.39 
It determined that the executive branch's determination to exclude a noncitizen was 
entitled to deference. 40 So long as the Attorney General offered a "facially legitimate 
and bona fide reason" for the exclusion, the Court's inquiry was complete.41 The 
Court would not pry into the executive's motives to determine if the stated reason 
was mere pretext.42 
31 8 U.S.C. § 1182. For an analysis of the legislative history of this provision, see Dan 
Ordorica, Note, PresidentialPowerandAmerican Fear:A HistoryofINA § 212(F), 99 B.U. L. 
REv. 1839, 1871-72 (2019) (arguing that Congress intended to authorize the broadest possible 
authority to exclude noncitizens but that the judiciary could develop more robust standards 
for its exercise). 
32 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Tiersfor the EstablishmentClause, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 
80 (2017). 
3 See id. 
34 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
35 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2419. 
36 Mandel, 408 U.S. at 756-57. 
37 Id at 756. 
38 Id at 757-59. 
39 See id. at 768-70. 
40 Id at 770. 
41 Id 
42 Id 
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The Court elaborated on this inquiry years later in Kerry v. Din.43 In Din, an 
American citizen, Fauzia Din, sought a spousal visa for her husband, Berashk, who 
lived in Afghanistan.44 Berashk was denied the visa, with the State Department 
stating only that he was inadmissible under INA section 212(a)(3)(B), a provision 
related to terrorism.4 5 It provided no further explanation or supporting facts. 46 The 
trial court and Ninth Circuit determined that Din had a constitutional liberty interest 
in cohabiting with her husband in the United States and that the State Department's 
47 Aadjudication, lacking a full explanation of the decision, violated due process. 
plurality of Justices disagreed. 48 The Supreme Court held that, even if Din had a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in living with her husband in the U.S., the 
procedure used by the State Department did not violate due process.4 9 The State Depart-
ment had offered a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" for the denial 
specifically, it had cited the INA provision, section 212(a)(3)(B), and it had described 
what that provision covered.50 It was not required to further explain what conduct 
it believed Berashk had engaged in.51 Thus, Din appears to require as little of the 
government as Mandel. 
In his concurring opinion, however, Justice Kennedy presented the possibility 
ofgreater scrutiny under certain narrow circumstances.52 He observed that "[a]bsent 
an affirmative showing of bad faith .. .plausibly alleged with sufficient particular-
ity," the Court would not look further into the adjudicator's decisionmaking. 53 But 
what if bad faith abounds? At least one federal court of appeals construed Din as 
permitting more searching review where the executive evinces bad faith.54 But the 
Supreme Court rejected this approach in Trump v. Hawaii.55 Instead, the Court em-
phasized deference to the President and looked to the official statements ofpurpose 
behind the bans ignoring the bevy of public statements evincing racial and reli-
gious animus.56 
43 576 U.S. 86 (2015). 
44 Id at 88 (plurality opinion). 
45 Id at 89-90. 
46 Id 
47 Id at 90. 
48 See generally id 
49 Id at 101. 
50 See id at 103-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
51 See id at 101 (plurality opinion). 
52 See id at 105 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
5' See id 
54 See, e.g., Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233,264 (4th Cir. 2018) 
(describing Din as accounting "for those very rare instances in which a challenger plausibly 
alleges that a government action runs o contrary to the basic premises of our Constitution as 
to warrant more probing review"). 
5 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2440 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
56 Id at 2421 (majority opinion). 
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In Hawaii, the Court applied Mandel to an exclusion policy rather than a single 
exclusion decision.57 It deemed national security to constitute an "independent jus-
tification."" Rather than inquiring whether this "facially legitimate reason" was in 
fact bona fide, considering the allegations of bad faith, the Court stopped at facial 
legitimacy and considered whether any facts on record supportedthe statedjustifica-
tion. Finding that the administration had conducted a multiagency worldwide 
review of vetting protocols, the Court determined that the record contained such 
facts. 60 Ultimately, evidence of bad faith had no impact on the Court's analytic 
framework. That the Court remained unmoved, despite smoking gun evidence of 
animus, has proven to be one of Hawaii's legacies. 
Four Justices dissented. 61 Justices Breyer and Kagan began with the premise that 
the Proclamation would be unlawful "[i]f its promulgation or content was signifi-
cantly affected by religious animus against Muslims." 2 In contrast, if its "sole" basis 
was national security, it would be lawful. 63 This, in effect, turnedthe majority's test 
on its head. Although the majority found plaintiffs unlikely to succeed absent 
allegations that religious animus was the sole basis for the Proclamation, Justices 
Breyer and Kagan would find the Proclamation unlawful if nationalsecurity were 
not the sole basis. 64 
Apart from offering a different framework, these Justices drew inferences from 
how the government applied the Proclamation in practice. Specifically, the Justices 
looked to the "elaborate system of exemptions and waivers" for information about 
the Proclamation's similarity to or differences from prior presidential orders in immi-
gration law. 65 The Proclamation's system of exemptions and case-by-case waivers, 
if available in practice, would bolster its lawfulness. 66 The Justices expressed concern, 
however, that the waivers and exemptions were not available even to Muslims who 
met "the Proclamation's own security terms." 67 First, the State Department and the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had not issued any guidance for consular 
officers to follow when adjudicating requests for waivers or exemptions. 68 Second, 
57 See generally id (considering a provision that gives the President authority to provide 
further limitations on entry beyond those in the INA). 
58 Id at 2420-21. 
9 Id (noting "persuasive evidence that the entry suspension has a legitimate grounding 
in national security concerns" but not addressing evidence of animus). 
60 Id at 2421 ("The Proclamation ... reflects the results of a worldwide review process 
undertakenby multiple Cabinet officials and their agencies."). 
61 See generally id 
62 Id at 2429 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
63 Id 
64 See id 
65 Id at 2429-30. 
66 Id 
67 See id at 2430. 
68 Idat2431. 
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publicly available statistics uggested that the government had granted only a "minus-
cule percentage" of waivers to those who were likely eligible for them.69 Finally, the 
Justices noted that a consular officer filed an affidavit in pending litigation in federal 
district court, indicating that he lacked discretion to grant waivers.70 If true, the waiver 
process would rightly be understood as "mere[] 'window dressing."' 71 Thus, the 
Justices sounded a note of caution but called for further proceedings to develop the 
facts regarding the operation ofthe waiver process. 
Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg, dissenting separately, rejected the majority's 
deferential approach to the Proclamation. 72 They concluded that plaintiffs were likely 
to succeed on their Establishment Clause claim because a "reasonable observer would 
conclude that the Proclamation was motivated by anti-Muslim animus." 73 Reserving 
judgment onplaintiffs' "complex statutory claims," the Justices determined that the 
constitutional question was "far simpler." 74 The Justices catalogued the President's 
anti-Muslim statements on the campaign trail and after the inauguration and chided the 
majority for merely "set[ting] them aside" and deferring on national security grounds.75 
The Justices questioned Mandel'sapplicability, but they determined that even under 
Mandel, plaintiffs were likely to succeed based on the Supreme Court's animus juris-
prudence.76 In direct opposition to the majority's conclusion, Justices Sotomayor and 
Kagan determined that the Proclamation was "divorced from any factual context 
from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests." 77 In addi-
tion, they did not regard the multiagency worldwide review as having any cleansing 
effect on earlier versions ofthe travel ban.78 Finally, they cautioned that the majority 
had made the same mistake that the majority had made in Korematsu rending the 
nation's "constitutional fabric" with a "barren invocation of national security." 79 
Because plaintiffs in Hawaiiasserted an Establishment Clause claim, but not an 
equal protection claim, the Court lacked an opportunity to evaluate the travel ban under 
equal protection principles.80 The Supreme Court generally reviews race-based equal 
69 Id 
70 Id at2432-33. 
71 Id (quoting and citing Declaration of Christopher Richardson at 3-4, Alharbi v. Miller, 
368 F. Supp. 3d 527 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (No. 1:18-cv-2435)). 
72 See id at 2433 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
73 Id 
74 dat2434. 
75 Id at 2440. 
76 Id at 2441-42 (discussing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and City of Cleburne 
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)). 
77 Id 2440-42 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 635). 
78 Id at 2443. 
79 Id at 2447-48. 
80 Cf Shirin Sinnar & Jayashri Srikantiah, White Nationalismas ImmigrationPolicy, 71 
STAN. L. REV. 197 (2019) (arguing that plaintiffs should bring equal protection claims to 
challenge white nationalist immigration policies). 
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protection challenges to facially neutral laws according to the framework developed 
in Village ofArlingtonHeightsv. MetropolitanHousingDevelopment Corp.81 There, 
the Court explained that an "official action will not be held unconstitutional solely 
because it results in a racially disproportionate impact." 2 But when a plaintiff has 
proof of a discriminatory purpose, deference to the legislature "is no longer justi-
fied." 3 Thus, when a law is facially neutral, the plaintiff must prove that invidious 
discrimination played a role, and many factors are probative, including disparate 
impact based on race, the historical background ofa decision, procedural or substantive 
irregularities, and legislative or administrative history.84 The Court further explained 
that invidious discrimination need not be the only motive or even the primary motive. 85 
Ultimately, plaintiffs had to show that the same decision would not have been made ab-
sent invidious discrimination.86 Thus, the Court endorsed a "but-for" motive standard.87 
In immigration law, however, the Supreme Court has generally insulated 
executive judgments from rights-based challenges. In Reno v. American-ArabAnti-
DiscriminationCommittee, the Court held that deportable noncitizens who claimed 
to have been targeted for deportation based on their political speech and national 
origin had no right against selective deportation under the First Amendment because 
the executive has prosecutorial discretion.88 Even amidst allegations of discrimina-
tion, the Court ruled that the special role of the executive in law enforcement 
requires the judiciary to defer to the executive's discretionary judgments. 89 Absent 
"'outrageous' ... discrimination," the judiciary lacks authority to review the execu-
tive's choice to enforce the law against specific individual offenders." 
Similarly, every federal court of appeals to consider an equal protection chal-
lenge to a DHS program requiring certain deportable Middle Eastern men to register 
with the government rejected that claim." In Rajah v. Mukasey, the Second Circuit 
81 429 U.S. 252,265 (1977) (affirming the requirement of"[p]roof ofracially discriminatory 
intent or purpose to show a violation ofthe Equal Protection Clause"); see Andrew Verstein, 
The JurisprudenceofMixed Motives, 127 YALE L.J. 1106, 1144 (2018). 
82 ArlingtonHeights, 429 U.S. at 264-65. 
83 Id at266. 
84 See id at 267-68. 
85 Id at 265. 
86 Id 
87 Verstein, supranote 81, at 1144 (discussing Arlington Heights). 
88 525 U.S. 471, 489-91 (1999). 
89 Id at490. 
90 But this doctrine has evolved, and recent judicial decisions have elaborated on the 
"'outrageous' ... discrimination" exception. See Ragbir v. Homan, 923 F.3d 53, 69 (2d Cir. 
2019) (quoting AADC, 525 U.S. at 488). In Ragbir, the Second Circuit concluded that the 
government's targeting of an immigration activist for deportation based on his advocacy 
constituted "outrageous" discrimination, permitting judicial review of his claim of selective 
deportation. Id 
91 Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 439 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Kandamar v. Gonzales, 
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applied only rational basis review to the program based on the government's national 
security justification and the noncitizens' deportability.92 Notably, plaintiffs lacked 
direct evidence ofpresidential animus there.93 With existing jurisprudence offering 
only limited guidance on the proper analytic framework for equal protection chal-
lenges to executive action in immigration law, Hawaiifilled a void. 
B. Arbitraryand CapriciousReview Under the APA 
Apart from seeking constitutional review, plaintiffs challenging executive action 
in immigration law during the Trump Administration have sought review under the 
APA. Under section 706(2) of the APA, a reviewing court shall "hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (A) arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse ofdiscretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 94 In its State 
Farm decision, the Supreme Court described the arbitrary and capricious tandard 
as "narrow," but that agency action would be arbitrary and capricious when: 
[T]he agency has relied on factors which Congress has not in-
tended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect 
of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs 
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible 
that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product 
of agency expertise.95 
Based on SEC v. Chenery Corp., reviewing courts lack the authority to supply 
reasoning for a challenged action that the agency has not itself articulated.96 Decades 
later, the Court clarified that an agency that changes a policy need not overcome any 
additional hurdle injustification beyond what it would need to for adopting a policy 
in the first instance. 97 In FCCv. Fox Television Stations, Inc., the Court ruled that 
"it suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good 
reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the conscious 
change of course adequately indicates." 98 According to the Court, an agency need 
464 F.3d 65, 73-74 (1st Cir. 2006); Ali v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 678, 681 n.4 (5th Cir. 2006); 
Zafar v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 461 F.3d 1357, 1367 (11th Cir. 2006). 
92 Rajah, 544 F.3d at 439. 
93 Id 
94 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). 
95 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
96 Id (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)); see Kevin M. Stack, The 
ConstitutionalFoundationsofChenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 962 (2007) (noting evolution of 
the Chenery rule from applying to adversarial adjudication to applying to informal agency 
action as well). 
97 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). 
98 Id 
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not do more than consider serious reliance interests created by an earlier policy or 
provide an explanation when the agency's factual findings contradict ones support-
ing the earlier policy." 
At its core, this standard requires that an agency supply "a reasoned explanation 
for its action."100 In Judulangv. Holder, the Supreme Court invalidated, under the 
arbitrary and capricious standard, a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) policy 
regarding the availability ofdiscretionary relief from removal.101 The Court deemed 
arbitrary and capricious the BIA's failure to consider the noncitizen's "fitness to 
02reside" in the U.S. in determining whether to make discretionary relief available.1 
In particular, the Court faulted the BIA for failing to consider factors including, "the 
seriousness ofthe offense, evidence of either rehabilitation or recidivism, the duration 
of the alien's residence, the impact of deportation on the family, the number of 
citizens in the family, and the character of any service in the Armed Forces."10 3 The 
Court likened the BIA's policy to distributing relief based on a "coin flip."10 4 As a 
0 5 result, it was arbitrary and capricious. 1 
Arbitrary and capricious review under the APA has been routinely characterized 
as more stringent than rational basis review,106 which offers one possible reason why 
policies that survive minimal constitutional scrutiny could nonetheless violate the 
APA.107 
II. DISTRICT COURTS APPLY TRUMP V. HA WAII AND THE APA108 
Plaintiffs challenging a range of executive action in immigration law have 
asserted both constitutional and administrative law claims. Hawaiihas influenced 
the federal courts on questions of immigration law beyond the analysis of entry 
99 Id 
100 Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 45 (2011). 
101 Id 
102 Id at 53. 
103 Id at 48 (quoting Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 296 n.5 
(2001)). 
104 Id at 56. 
105 Id. at 45. 
106 See Gillian Metzger, OrdinaryAdministrativeLaw as ConstitutionalCommon Law, 
110 COLUM. L. REv. 479, 491 (2010). 
107 In addition, the many jurisdiction-stripping provisions ofthe Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA) removed some agency action from APA review. See JARED P. COLE, CONG. RSCH. 
SERV., R44699, AN INTRODUCTION TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCY ACTION 1 1-12 
(2016). The Supreme Court has held that the APA creates a "presumption ofjudicial review," 
but an agency may defeat this presumption if another statute clearly precludes review. Id 
108 For an overview of litigation challenging the Trump Administration's immigration 
policies, see generally Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, ImmigrationLitigation in the Time of Trump, 
53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 121 (2019). 
786 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29:775 
bans. This Part begins with a survey ofrecent litigation in three broad areas: (1) the 
exclusion of immigrants not present on U.S. soil; (2) the rescission of status for immi-
grants who have been admitted into the U.S.; and (3) policies directed at immigrants 
who have not yet been admitted into the U.S. (whether present on U.S. soil or not). This 
range of cases helps showcase the factors that influence courts' analyses of immi-
grants' constitutional rights claims. This Part also explains how district courts have 
treated the ordinary administrative law claims raised by plaintiffs in these cases. 
A. TravelBan & Waiver Litigation 
The first set of cases involves ongoing challenges to the travel ban and its 
associated waiver procedure. 109 Under the third version of the 2017 travel ban, a 
noncitizen whose entry is barred under the ban may seek an individualized waiver." 
The Proclamation provides for case-by-case waivers if the consular officer deter-
mines that the applicant satisfies three criteria: "(A) denying entry would cause the 
foreign national undue hardship; (B) entry would not pose a threat to the national 
security or public safety of the United States; and (C) entry would be in the national 
interest."i The waiver plays an integral role in the overall ban. In Trump v. Hawaii, 
the majority referenced the waiver as evidence of the ban's legitimacy. 1 2 
However, the State Department has granted few waivers. As noted above, in their 
dissenting opinion in Hawaii, the "minuscule" number of grants prompted Justices 
Breyer and Kagan to question the authenticity ofthe waiver process.1 3 Instead, the 
Justices posited that the waiver process could be mere "window dressing" for an 
unconstitutional entry ban.1 4 They contended that a sham waiver process would 
suggest that animus tainted the entry ban, thus rendering it unconstitutional.1 1 5 
Federal district courts have considered separate legal challenges to the waiver 
process. In Emami v. Nielsen, plaintiffs brought a class action challenge to the State 
109 See Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017); Proclamation No. 
9983, 85 Fed. Reg. 6699 (Jan. 31, 2020). On January 31, 2020, the President added six 
countries to the list, restricting the issuance of immigrant visas but not nonimmigrant visas. 
Proclamation No. 9983, 85 Fed Reg. 6701-02. 
10 Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,168 (Sept. 24, 2017). 
1" Id; Letter from Mary K. Waters, Assistant Sec'y for Legis. Affs., U.S. Dep't of State, 
to the Hon. Chris Van Hollen, U.S. Senator (Feb. 22, 2018), https://paaia.org/wp-content/up 
loads/2018/03/Van-Hollen-Response-Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/LD86-4MM6]. 
12 138 . Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). 
113 Id at 2431 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Between Dec. 8, 2017 and Oct. 31, 2018, just six 
percent of applicants were granted waivers, and ofthose, thirty percent had not yet received 
them by early 2019. See Yeganeh Torbati, Exclusive: Only 6PercentofThose Subject o Trump 
TravelBan GrantedU.S. Waivers, REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article 
/us-usa-immigration-visas-exclusive/exclusive-only-6-percent-of-those-subject-to-trump-travel 
-ban-granted-u-s-waivers-idUSKCN1RG30X [https://perma.cc/CPQ3-R928]. 
14 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2433 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
15 Id at 2432-33. 
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Department's implementation of the travel ban waiver process.1 6 There, the court 
determined that plaintiffs had failed to state claims under due process and equal 
protection.11 7 The court ruled that plaintiffs' allegations underlying those claims 
were conclusory and likely subject to rational basis review.1 8 As in Hawaii, the 
government proffered a national security justification, which the court took to 
satisfy the requirement of a rational basis." 9 Similarly, plaintiffs had not alleged 
deprivation of a fundamental right.12 0 
Nonetheless, the plaintiffs succeeded in stating a claim under the APA and the 
Accardi doctrine.1 2 1 The Accardi doctrine requires agencies to follow their own 
procedures.12 2 The Emamicourt ruled that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that the 
State Department failed to follow the procedures they announced on their website 
for the adjudication ofwaivers, thus violating Accardi.123 Specifically, plaintiffs had 
alleged instances where they were denied further interviews or an opportunity to 
submit documents demonstrating their eligibility for a waiver, contrary to the pro-
cedure outlined by the State Department.124 
Other constitutional challenges to the waiver procedure have also faltered. In 
Alharbi v. Miller, plaintiffs sought class certification for a group of U.S. citizens, 
lawful permanent residents, and asylees who filed family visa petitions for Yemeni 
national relatives and the relatives on whose behalf the petitions were filed.125 
Plaintiffs contended thatthey were "issued" visas before the Proclamation, but the court 
found that they were simply given a printed piece of paper, rather than an official 
document. 126 As a result, they were not "issued" visas such that they could be grand-
fathered under the Proclamation's provision for those noncitizens who had been issued 
visas prior to the date ofthe Proclamation. 127 Furthermore, the court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction to review the "consular officer's decision to revoke a previously 
issued visa." 12 Applying Mandel and Hawaii,the court also viewed the Proclama-
tion as a "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" for failure of visas to issue.12 9 
116 See generally 365 F. Supp. 3d 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
17 Id at 1022. 
us Id 
119 Id at 1023. 
120 Id at 1022. 
121 Id at 1020. 
122 Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 262-63 (1954); Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Accardi Principle,74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 569, 569 (2006). 
123 Emami, 365 F. Supp. 3d at 1021. 
124 Id 
125 368 F. Supp. 3d 527 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). 
126 Id at 541, 553. 
127 Id at 555. 
128 Id 
129 Id at 562-63, 571. 
788 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29:775 
Plaintiffs further claimed a violation ofequal protection, relying exclusively on 
Trump's anti-Muslim rhetoric.130 But the court determined that the bigoted state-
ments alone did not constitute a "but-for" motive for the Proclamation, but rather, 
might have been "in spite of' it. 131 Finally, the court determined that Hawaiifore-
closed the Establishment Clause claim. 13 2 Thus, the district court granted the govern-
ment's motion to dismiss, finding plaintiffs' allegations "conclusory." 133 
Other district courts have interpreted the Mandel standard to permit a more 
rigorous review than that undertaken by the Alharbi court. In Arab-American Civil 
Rights League v. Trump, the district court denied the government's motion to dismiss 
plaintiffs' complaint challenging the Proclamation as a violation of the First Amend-
ment's guarantee of speech, religion, and associational rights, and the equal protection 
component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.134 The court ruled that 
Mandelgoverned all constitutional claims, which required upholding any exclusion 
1decision based upon a "facially legitimate and bona fide" reason. 3 5 Nonetheless, the 
court concluded that plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently alleged violations under this 
standard. 136 The court specifically rejected the government's contention that Hawaii 
v. Trump mandated dismissal ofplaintiffs' claims; instead, the court emphasized that 
the Supreme Court had considered only the highly limited factual record that had 
developed in the dispute over issuance of a preliminary injunction. 137 At the motion 
to dismiss phase, the court concluded that plaintiffs had stated a claim for relief.138 
Similarly, in InternationalRefugee Assistance Projectv. Trump, the district 
court applied rational basis review to plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to the travel 
ban Proclamation and denied the government's motion to dismiss based onHawaii.139 
The court observed that rational basis review, although deferential, has previously 
led to the invalidation ofgovernment classifications.4 Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged 
uneven application of the national security criteria, suggesting that the criteria were 
mere pretext. 141 In order to prevail, however, plaintiffs would have to refute the 
government's national security rationale. 14 2 
130 Id at 563. 
131 Id at 564; see Shalini Bhargava Ray, PlenaryPowerandAnimus in ImmigrationLaw, 
80 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 19 (2019) (arguing for a but-for motive standard in this litigation). For 
a recent discussion of "but-for" causation in civil rights law, see Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l 
Ass'n Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1014 (2020). 
132 Alharbi, 368 F. Supp. 3d at 561. 
133 Id at 564. 
134 399 F. Supp. 3d 717, 719 (E.D. Mich. 2019). 
135 Id at 726 (quoting Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419-20 (2018)). 
136 Id at 728. 
137 Id 
138 Id at 729. 
139 373 F. Supp. 3d 650, 660 (D. Md. 2019), rev'd, 961 F.3d 635 (4th Cir. 2020). 
140 Id at 670 (discussing the animus cases). 
141 Id at 674 (discussing pretext). 
142 Id at 676. 
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The Fourth Circuit ultimately rejected this conclusion in InternationalRefugee 
Assistance Project, noting that the Supreme Court had already definitively deter-
mined that he most recent Proclamation bore some relationship to the stated national 
security objectives. 143 It was no longer an open question whether the Proclamation 
had some rational basis. Even ifthe Proclamation only obliquely related to the stated 
objective, or even frustrated those objectives at some level, it was immune from 
invalidation under rational basis review. 144 All that was required was some showing 
ofplausiblereasons, even if pretextual. 
The ongoing challenges to the 2017 travel ban and its waiver procedure reveal dis-
trict courts applying Mandel to constitutional claims and alternatingly exhibiting 
great deference or, following the "animus" cases,"' allowing claims to proceed on the 
notion that the disputed orders might fail even on rational basis review. 146 The Fourth 
Circuit, however, does not view rational basis review as permitting a court to weigh 
competing considerations: if the challenged law is based on plausible reasons, it 
stands. 14 7Apart from echoing this deferential approach to immigrants' constitutional 
claims, cases like Emami also demonstrate that where constitutional claims might 
fail, anAccardiclaim might succeed. These cases collectively demonstrate the limits 
of constitutional rights in protecting immigrants' well-being as well as the promise 
of relief based on challenges to agency process. 
B. TemporaryProtectedStatus 
Apart from banning the entry ofnoncitizens, the Trump Administration has also 
sought to end lawful status for hundreds of thousands of immigrants already here. 
In 2017, the administration ended TPS for immigrants from Haiti, Honduras, El 
Salvador, Sudan, and Nepal.14 8 Congress created TPS in 1990 in response to the 
need to provide temporary lawful status to immigrants from countries that had 
experienced natural disasters or war. 149 Congress further established a procedure for 
143 Id at 652. 
144 Id at 651. 
145 See William D. Araiza, Animus and Its Discontents, 71 FLA. L. REV. 155, 168-70 
(2019); Ray, supra note 131, at 50. 
146 Ray, supranote 131, at 48. 
147 Id at62-63. 
148 Kathryn Johnson & Peniel Ibe, Trump Has Ended Temporary ProtectedStatus for 
HundredsofThousandsoflmmigrants. Here's What You Need to Know, AM. FRIENDS SERV. 
COMM. (June 30, 2020), https://www.afsc.org/blogs/news-and-commentary/trump-has-ended 
-temporary-protected-status-hundreds-thousands-immigrants [https://perma.cc/A87D-XDQR]. 
149 JILL H. WILSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS20844, TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS: 
OVERVIEWAND CURRENT ISSUES 2(2020). TPS shields certain noncitizens from deportation, 
authorizing them to work during their stay. INA § 244(b) explains eligibility: 
The Attorney General, after consultation with appropriate agencies ofthe 
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the designation and de-designation of affected areas. Specifically, the INA authorizes 
the DHS Secretary to make an initial designation, and then provides for periodic 
review after the initial designation, every sixty days.1 5 0 If the DHS Secretary deter-
mines that the foreign state previously designated "no longer continues to meet the 
conditions for designation," they must publish a notice in the Federal Register ex-
plaining the basis for the determination.15 1 If the DHS Secretary wishes to extend the 
designation, they may do so for a period of twelve or eighteen months.1 5 2 The Secre-
tary's determination is conclusive and not subject o judicial review.153 Over decades, 
the INS and then DHS have followed a standard procedure for making designation 
decisions namely, consulting with the State Department, the National Security 
Council, and sometimes the Department of Justice.15 4 
A wide range of community and legal organizations challenged the TPS termi-
nations. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund brought suit to challenge the termination 
of TPS for Haitians, alleging that the decision reflected racial animus rather than 
objective review of country conditions.1 5 5 The Family Action Network Movement 
Government, may designate any foreign state ... under this subsection 
only if 
(A) The Attorney General finds that there is an ongoing armed 
conflict within the state and, due to such conflict, requiring the return 
of aliens who are nationals ofthat state to that state ... would pose 
a serious threat to their personal safety; 
(B) The Attorney General finds that 
(i) There has been an earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, 
or other environmental disaster in the state resulting in a sub-
stantial, but temporary, disruption to living conditions in the 
area affected, 
(ii) The foreign state is unable, temporarily, to handle ade-
quately the return to the state of aliens who are nationals of 
the state, and 
(iii) The foreign state officially has requested designation 
under this subparagraph; or 
(A) The Attorney General finds that there exist extraordinary and 
temporary conditions in the foreign state that prevent aliens who 
are nationals of the state from returning to the state in safety, unless 
the Attorney General finds that permitting the aliens to remain 
temporarily in the United States is contrary to the national interest 
of the United States .... 
Immigration and Nationality Act § 244(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b). 
" 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A). 
151 Id § 1254a(b)(3)(B). 
152 Id § 1254a(b)(3)(C). 
153 Id § 1254a(b)(5)(B). 
154 TemporaryProtectedStatus:An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Jan. 20, 2020), https:// 
www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/temporary-protected-status-overview 
[https://perma.cc/QK3S-9PAW]. 
155 See NAACP v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp. 3d 568, 572 (D. Md. 2019); 
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challenged the rescission of TPS for Haitians as well in the Saget case. 156 The 
nonprofit Centro Presente challenged the termination on behalf of TPS recipients 
from Honduras, El Salvador, and Haiti, alleging violations of equal protection and 
1due process. 5 7 Casa de Maryland sued on behalf of Salvadoran nationals, bringing 
APA claims in addition to constitutional ones. 158 Finally, the ACLU brought suit on 
behalf of TPS recipients from El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Sudan, and their 
U.S. citizen children.15 9 
All plaintiffs faced arguments that the courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
over their claims.160 INA section 244(b)(5)(A) states: "There is no judicial review of 
any determination of the Attorney General with respect o the designation, or termina-
tion or extension ofa designation, ofa foreign state under this subsection."6 1 Courts 
have acknowledged that thisprecludes judicial review ofthe substantive designation 
decision or the "content," but some have ruled that it does not preclude review ofthe 
processby which the agency makes the decision.16 2 In addition, at least one court noted 
that the provision did not preclude review of constitutional claims specifically.163 
Plaintiffs in these lawsuits alleged a general pattern of DHS jettisoning long-
standing practices regarding TPS designations and manipulating the process to obtain 
a predetermined result to end TPS for tens ofthousands of Black and brown immi-
grants. According to plaintiffs in Saget, for example, DHS leadership manipulated 
the longstanding re-designation process to force a recommendation for termination 
of TPS for Haitians. 164 DHS initially designated Haiti for TPS in 2010 following a 
devastating earthquake there. 165 In 2017, plaintiffs alleged, United States Citizenship 
and Immigration Services (USCIS) researchers initially determined that conditions 
in Haiti warranted an extension of TPS, citing the earthquake's continuing effect on 
Raymond Audain, Not Yet Forgivenfor Being Black: Haiti'sTPS, LDF, and the Protean 
StruggleforRacialJustice, 52 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 409, 412 (2019). 
156 Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280, 328-29, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (granting prelimi-
nary injunction). 
157 Centro Presente v. Dep't ofHomeland Sec., 332 F. Supp. 3d 393,396 (D. Mass. 2018). 
158 Casa de Md., Inc. v. Trump, 355 F. Supp. 3d 307, 312 (D. Md. 2018). 
159 Ramos I, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1092-93, 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (denying the govern-
ment's motion to dismiss), vacatedsub nom. Ramos II, 975 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020). 
160 See Saget, 375 F. Supp. at 330; NAACP v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp. 3d at 
574; Casa de Md, Inc., 355 F. Supp. at 316; Ramos I, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1088; Centro 
Presente, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 386. It appears that only the NAACP brought constitutional claims 
alone. See generally NAACP v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp. 3d 568. The other 
plaintiffs brought constitutional claims as well as APA claims. See generally Saget, 375 F. 
Supp. 3d 280; Casa de Md, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 307; Ramos I, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075; Centro 
Presente, 332 F. Supp. 3d 393. 
161 Immigration and Nationality Act § 244(b)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(5)(A). 
162 Saget, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 333. 
163 NAACP v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp. 3d at 575. 
164 Saget, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 347. 
165 Id at 301. 
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infrastructure, health, sanitation services, and emergency response capacity. 166 Plain-
tiffs alleged, however, that new US CIS appointees rejected this recommendation and 
sought to build a record in support of termination. 167 They "directed staffers" to 
revise the draft "to include an option for terminating TPS for Haiti."168 Ultimately, 
USCIS circulated a draft memorandum recommending termination, concluding that 
Haiti had "made significant progress in recovering from the 2010 earthquake" and 
no longer warranted the TPS designation. 169 Thus, according to plaintiffs, the DHS 
leadership pressed USCIS officials to launder their recommendation until it sup-
ported their preferred outcome.17 0 
The procedural irregularities that characterized this process led the Sagetcourt 
to conclude that plaintiffs had alleged violations of the APA. Specifically, DHS's 
failure to consider the currentstate ofHaiti, not merely conditions attributable tothe 
2010 earthquake, departed from prior practice, and DHS had failed to supply a 
"reasoned explanation" for the change in policy. 171 In addition, whatever review 
process occurred was designed to build a case for a predetermined outcome. 172 Rather 
than focusing on statutory factors such as earthquakes and dangerous conditions, 
DHS focused on "crime rates and public benefit usage by TPS holders."17 3 
Similarly, plaintiffs in Casade Maryland,Inc. alleged that the DHS Secretary's 
decision-making process ignored the extensive factual record that had supported re-
designation ofTPS for El Salvador eleven times from 2002 to 2016.174 The agency's 
departure fromits traditional approach to determining whether to re-designate a country 
served as circumstantial evidence of racial animus. 175 The court in CentroPresente 
determined that, based on documented procedural irregularities, plaintiffs had plausibly 
alleged that the TPS designation decision was both "arbitrary and capricious" and 
made "without 'observance of procedure required by law."' 176 Finally, in Ramos, the 
court observed that the record supported the view that the White House influenced 
166 Id 
167 Id. at 315. 
168 Id. at 305. 
169 Id at 306. 
170 See id. at 305-06, 372-74. 
171 Id at354; see also Ramos I, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1105-08 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (on motion 
for preliminary injunction, finding plaintiffs likely to succeed on APA claim due to agency's 
failure to provide a "reasoned explanation" for its departure from a prior policy or practice 
of considering "intervening conditions not directly related to the originating condition"), 
vacatedsub nom. Ramos II, 975 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020). 
172 Saget, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 299. 
173 Id 
174 Casa de Md., Inc. v. Trump, 355 F. Supp. 3d 307, 312 (D. Md. 2018). 
175 Nonetheless, the district court clarified that it lacked the authority to assess the merits 
ofthe Secretary's termination decision it could only determine that plaintiffs had stated an 
APA claim based on racial animus. Id. at 321. 
176 Centro Presente v. Dep't ofHomeland Sec., 332 F. Supp. 3d 393, 416 (D. Mass. 2018). 
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TPS decisions, with Acting Secretary Elaine Duke at one point attributing the 
terminations to an "America first view." 177 Moreover, declarations by career DHS 
employees revealed that the agency could arrive at a recommendation to terminate 
TPS only if it limited its consideration to those country conditions attributable to the 
original event triggering the designation; thus, intervening conditions that would 
justify a TPS designation according to the "standard metrics" would not be consid-
ered.178 Agency officials further resisted staffrecommendations for extending desig-
nations, noting, "I do not think [this] is the conclusion we are looking for." 179 
Allegations regarding a fundamental change in the nature of the TPS designation 
process led district courts in these cases to find plausible claims of APA violations. 
These courts also determined that plaintiffs had stated constitutional claims based 
on Trump's "racial animus towards immigrants ofcolor." 1 80 The Sagetplaintiffs argued 
that the evidence of racial animus triggered strict scrutiny of DHS's termination 
decision, Trump v. Hawaiinotwithstanding. 181 The district court agreed, noting that 
the national security rationale so prominent in Hawaiiwas absent in this case, and 
critically, that the noncitizens in question here were already present in the United 
States.18 2 As a result, the reasons forHawaii'sdeferential standard ofreview did not ap-
ply, and the court determined that a traditional equal protection analysis under 
Arlington Heights was proper.183 Implicitly, the court regarded the plenary power doc-
trine as irrelevant outside of the regulation of entry or the national security context. 
Other courts have similarly concluded that Trump v. Hawaiidoes not apply to 
plaintiffs' constitutional claims. In Ramos, the court observed not only that the 
government lacked a national security or foreign policy rationale for its TPS deci-
sion but that TPS beneficiaries have extensive ties to the U.S. that entitle them to 
greater constitutional protection. 184 Many have lived in the U.S. for years. In addi-
tion to lengthy terms of residence, TPS beneficiaries often have U.S. citizen chil-
dren, have obtained higher education i the U.S., and have had substantial careers 
in the U.S.185 Thus, they enjoy more robust constitutional protection than a non-
citizen seeking admission.186 Finally, in NAACP v. DepartmentofHomelandSecurity, 
the district court declined to apply "deferential rational basis review." 18 7As inSaget, 
177 Ramos I, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2018), vacatedsub. nom. Ramos II, 
975 F3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020).
178 Id at 1093, 1096, 1104. 
179 Id at 1104. 
180 Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). 
181 Id at 334-35; see alsoNAACP v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp. 3d 568, 578 
(D. Md. 2019). 
182 Saget, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 301-02. 
183 Id at 366. 
184 Ramos I, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1107; see alsoCentro Presente v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 
332 F. Supp. 3d 393, 411 (D. Mass. 2018). 
185 Ramos I, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1107. 
186 See, e.g., id at 1107-08; Centro Presente, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 411. 
187 364 F. Supp. 3d 568, 576 (D. Md. 2019). 
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the district court in NAACP v. DepartmentofHomelandSecurity determined that 
Arlington Heights applied.18" 
Ultimately, every district court considering challenges to TPS terminations 
permitted plaintiffs' constitutional claims to survive a motion to dismiss and, in at 
least one case, also granted a preliminary injunction based on plaintiffs' likelihood 
of success in establishing an equal protection violation.189 In NAACP v. Department 
ofHomelandSecurity,the court ruled that the INA's jurisdiction-stripping provision 
did not apply to constitutional challenges to the DHS Secretary's determination,9 
and plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that the Acting DHS Secretary refused to 
acknowledge evidence ofHaiti's troubled country conditions and failed to consider 
all the statutory factors.191 Combined with the President's racial animus, the court 
found that several factors supported a finding of discriminatory intent.1 9 2 In Ramos, 
the district court determined that he Equal Protection Clause applied to executive 
action in immigration law, and that the narrow review described in AADC applied 
only to individual selective prosecution rather than programmatic challenges. 193 
Similarly, Ramos found Rajah v. Mukasey distinguishable, despite the noncitizens' 
presence in U.S. territory in that case, because the government had advanced a national 
security rationale there, and the noncitizens at issue were otherwise deportable.19 4 
Although TPS determinations are committed to the DHS Secretary's discretion,19 5 
federal district courts ruling on the legality of the termination of TPS for several 
countries have held that plaintiffs' specific claims were reviewable. 196 Courts have 
noted that DHS's deviation from established procedure, combined with the Presi-
dent's rhetoric, supported an inference ofunconstitutional animus as well as a claim 
for violation of the APA.197 These courts have concluded that an "amalgam of factors" 
determine the constitutional status of particular noncitizens. 19 The presence or 
absence of a national security or foreign policy rationale matters, but so do the 
noncitizens' lawful presence in and ties to the United States. 
188 Id On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the applicability ofArlington Heights but de-
termined that plaintiffs had "fail[ed] to present even 'serious questions' on the merits" by failing 
to tie "the President's alleged discriminatory intent to the specific TPS terminations . ... " 
Ramos II, 975 F.3d 872, 897 (9th Cir. 2020). 
189 See generally, e.g., Ramos I, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075; CentroPresente, 332 F. Supp. 3d 
393; Casa de Md., Inc. v. Trump, 355 F. Supp. 3d 307 (D. Md. 2018); Saget v. Trump, 375 
F. Supp. 3d 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). 
190 364 F. Supp. 3d at 575. 
191 Id at 572-73, 578. 
192 See id at 576-78. 
193 Ramos I, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1105-08. 
194 Id at 1107-08. 
195 See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); Ramos I, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1082; Heckler v. Chaney, 470 
U.S. 821, 835 (1985). 
196 Ramos I, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1090, 1104-05. 
197 Id 
198 IdatllO7. 
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These early plaintiff victories, however, have proven fragile. In Ramos, for ex-
ample, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction, 
finding that none of plaintiffs' claims were likely to succeed. 199 The court deter-
mined that the APA claim was unreviewable and the equal protection claim failed 
because plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that Trump had directly influenced the 
TPS rescission decision.200 
C. HumanitarianParole 
The final set of cases I consider involves challenges to the administration's 
decision to rescind humanitarian parole in individual cases as well as on a mass 
scale. Humanitarian parole refers to "processes to allow entry or permission to 
remain in the United States to those [who] do not otherwise qualify for admis-
sion." 201 Under INA section 212(d)(5)(A), the Attorney General has the discretion 
to "parole" any noncitizen into the United States on a case-by-case basis "for urgent 
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit." 202 The applicable regulation 
permits parole of noncitizens with serious medical conditions, pregnant women, 
juveniles, witnesses in U.S. proceedings, or those whose detention "is not in the 
public interest" as determined by the DHS Secretary or their designees. 203 
The Obama Administration created the Central American Minors program 
(CAM) to permit minors from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to be consid-
ered for refugee resettlement in the U.S. while still in their home country.204 If 
deemed ineligible for resettlement, the minors were considered for humanitarian 
parole, but the Trump Administration terminated this program in 2017.205 In S.A. v. 
Trump, parents lawfully residing in the U.S. sued DHS and USCIS alleging that 
termination oftheir beneficiary children's conditionally approved parole under the 
CAM program violated the APA and the Equal Protection Clause. 206 The district 
court viewed DHS's termination of the CAM Parole Program as two actions: 1) 
terminating the Program going forward for new applicants, and 2) rescinding con-
ditional approvals ofparole made prior to termination.207 
199 Ramos II, 975 F.3d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 2020). 
200 Id at 899. 
201 ALISON KAMHI, LENA GRABER, ERIN J. QUINN, ALLISON DAVENPORT & JOSE MAGANA-
SALGADO, PAROLE IN IMMIGRATION LAW § 1.1 (1st ed. 2016). 
202 Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1 182(a)(5)(A). 
203 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)(5) (2020). 
204 CentralAmericanMinors(CAM): InformationforParoleApplicants,U.S.CITIZENSHIP 
& IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/humanitarian-parole/central-ameri 
can-minors-cam-information-for-parole-applicants [https://perma.cc/3MTE-BXER] (June 18, 
2019). 
205 Id 
206 363 F. Supp. 3d 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
207 Id at 1077. 
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The district court determined that plaintiffs had stated a claim challenging the 
second action, but not the first. 208 It ruled that termination of the program going 
forward satisfied the APA's requirement ofan adequate explanation because termi-
nation was consistent with Trump's desire to secure the border. 209 Unlike with the 
termination of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), the court noted, 
DHS terminated the program for policy reasons and took political responsibility for 
it.2 In addition, DHS's legal interpretation of the parole statute lacked the flaws 
tainting Secretary Nielsen's view ofDACA's purported illegality.211 The courtnoted 
that a parole termination was distinct from TPS termination aswell, because the TPS 
termination process involved a marked departure from past practice; here, the 
termination of CAM parole did not involve a marked departure from past parole 
terminations.12 Thus, the termination had a satisfactory explanation.213 
The court similarly rejected the notion that DHS had failed to consider "serious 
reliance interests."21 4 USCIS told applicants that it would consider requests for 
parole case-by-case, but it did not guarantee parole. 215 Similarly, the court found that 
neither a liberal awarding of parole in prior cases nor the payment of application 
fees creates a "serious reliance interest" in approval. 216 Nor did DHS's decision fail 
to consider "important aspects of the problem," such as the conditions in Central 
America, because the parole statute does not require DHS to consider such factors.217 
Plaintiffs succeeded, however, in stating a claim that DHS's rescission of condi-
tional approvals en masse was arbitrary and capricious. 218 Plaintiffs alleged that the 
government failed to consider serious reliance interests for those who were already 
approved." 9 Although DHS has authority to rescind conditionally approved parole 
applications, the only remaining steps for plaintiffs were entirely "nondiscretionary 
ones: completion ofa medical exam, final security checks, and making travel arrange-
ments."220 Thus, participants approved for parole had serious reliance interests, and 
DHS failed to explain why mass rescission was justified despite these interests.221 
In contrast to the court's treatment ofplaintiffs' APA claim regarding mass rescis-
sion, the court ruled that plaintiffs had not stated due process or equal protection 
208 Id at 1096. 
209 Id at 1080. 
210 Id at 1065-66. 
211 Id at 1082. 
212 Id at 1084. 
213 Id 
214 Id at 1087. 
215 Id at 1086. 
216 Id 
217 Id at 1088. 
218 Id at 1090. 
219 Id at 1085. 
220 Id at 1089. 
221 Id at 1090, 1094. 
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claims.222 First, plaintiffs lacked a protected liberty interest.223 Unlike an immigrant 
visa, parole created no statutorily created liberty interest.2 24 With respect to plain-
tiffs' claim that mass rescission reflected racial animus toward Latino and Latina 
immigrants, the court emphasized that plaintiffs' children had not yet entered the 
U.S., thus entitling them to a less rigorous standard of judicial review.225 Citing 
Trump v. Hawaii,the court noted that foreign nationals seeking entry lack a consti-
tutional right of entry, and U.S. citizens do have rights of association, but this triggers 
only a "circumscribed judicial inquiry." 2 2 According to the court, the Mandelstandard 
asks whether the policy is "inexplicable by anything but animus." 227 In other words, 
the court ruled that a policy will survive review under Mandel so long as animus is 
not the sole motive. 228 
The court regarded the termination of the CAM Parole Program as analogous 
229 to the entry ban under review in Hawaii. It credited the government's view that 
an over-generous use ofparole had contributed to the "border crisis" and that parole 
should be used "sparingly and only in individual cases." 230 The court explicitly 
attributed this conclusion to the deferential standard of review used in Hawaii, 
noting that an argument about animus might have more weight in a challenge to the 
termination of DACA or TPS, which "involve only individuals located in the United 
States." 231 The court weighed heavily the noncitizens' absence from U.S. territory, 
and the Mandel standard doomed plaintiffs' equal protection claim.232 Under the 
"facially legitimate and bona fide" standard, the court was powerless to "test [govern-
ment's] reasons [for terminating the CAM Parole Program] by balancing them against 
the plaintiffs' constitutional interests." 233 S.A. offers an example ofa court applying 
Mandeleven when the challenged policy lacks a national security rationale; instead, 
the court applied Mandel because the noncitizens were not present on U.S. soil. 2 3 4 
Courts considering other parole-related claims have similarly applied a deferen-
tial standard of review. In Gutierrez-Soto v. Sessions, petitioners sought a writ of 
habeas corpus based on the Attorney General's revocation of their humanitarian 
parole, allegedly in violation of their constitutional rights under substantive due 
222 Id at 1093. 
223 Id 
224 Id 
225 Id at 1088. 
226 Id at 1093. 
227 Id 
228 See Verstein, supranote 81, at 1139 (describing the "sole motive" standard). 
229 S.A., 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1093. 
230 Id at 1064. 
231 Id at 1095. 
232 Id at 1096. 
233 Id 
234 See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Trump v. Hawaii and the FutureofPresidentialPower 
over Immigration,2 AM. CONST. SOC'Y SUP. CT. REV. 161 (2018). 
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process, equal protection, procedural due process, and the APA.235 The district court 
determined that it retained jurisdiction over petitioners' substantive due process 
claim under Zadvydas v. Davis.236 However, it ruled that plaintiffs had not articulated 
a violation of their rights.237 Specifically, the court ruled that Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) had not violated petitioners' rights by initially granting them parole, 
letting them work, live, and build a network for ten years, followed by abruptly appre-
hending and detaining them.238 Similarly, the court determined that petitioners had 
9not suffered an equal protection violation based on Trump's anti-Mexican rhetoric. 23 
The court applied Trump v. Hawaii and determined that petitioners' revocation of 
parole could "be reasonably understood to result from a justification independent of 
unconstitutional grounds." 24 Harsher immigration enforcement per se (revealed in 
DHS policy changes) was not evidence ofnational origin discrimination.241 Finally, 
ICE emails showed that they targeted petitioners because their asylum claims failed, 
not because of their national origin.242 
By downgrading the due process and equal protection rights ofplaintiff-parolees, 
the district court revived a trend or theme in immigrants' rights jurisprudence that 
weighs a formal admission heavily in evaluating the constitutional protection due 
to a noncitizen.243 Where the government does not advance a national security 
rationale, noncitizens' presence in the U.S. typically enhances their constitutional 
status.244 Although the noncitizens denied parole in S.A. were located outside the 
United States, the petitioners in Gutierrez-Sotowere already here. 245 Moreover, the 
plaintiffs in Gutierrez-Soto alleged just the sort of "substantial ties" with the U.S. 
that TPS beneficiaries described in their initially successful complaints. 246 And 
although parolees have not been "admitted," they are present with the permission 
of the United States. The district court appears to have weighed heavily the lack of 
formal admission, overlooking the significance of a noncitizen's presence in the 
United States.247 
235 See generally 317 F. Supp. 3d 917 (W.D. Tex. 2018). 
236 Id at 925 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001)). 
237 Id at 928-29. 
238 Id at 929. 
239 Id at930-31. 
240 Id at 931 (quoting Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419 (2018)). 
241 Id 
242 Id 
243 See David A. Martin, GraduatedApplicationofConstitutionalProtectionsforAliens: 
The RealMeaningofZadvydas v Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 71 (arguing that immigrants' 
rights jurisprudence weighs both a noncitizen's community ties and formal admission in 
calibrating constitutional protection, thus putting parolees in an unfavorable position). 
244 Id at 84. 
245 CompareGutierrez-Soto,317 F. Supp. 3d at 921-23, with S.A. v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 
3d 1048, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
246 S.A., 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1067. 
247 See id. at 1089-91. 
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Surprisingly, given the court's dim view ofpetitioners' constitutional status and 
AADC's general prohibition on selective deportation claims, the court ruled that 
petitioners had stated a First Amendment claim. 248 As a journalist who criticized 
ICE, petitioner was apprehended months after an event at the National Press Club, 
thus establishing proximity between his expressive conduct and adverse action.249 
The court concludedthat "[d]rawing all reasonable inferences in favor ofPetitioners, 
the evidence could establish that Respondents retaliated against immigrant activists 
who criticized the government's policies."250 Thus, the court denied summary judg-
ment on these claims.251 
These humanitarianparole cases show the peril of Mandel for plaintiffs andthe 
uncertain constitutional status of parolees, despite their presence within U.S. 
territory and the lack of any national security rationale in terminating their status. 
III. EMERGING LESSONS 
Challenges to executive action in immigration law demonstrate the continuing 
vitality of traditional administrative law claims amid mixed success for constitu-
tional claims, and this, I argue, is partly the legacy of Trump v. Hawaii. Scholars have 
characterized arbitrary and capricious review under the APA as more stringent25 2 
and more flexible than rational basis review of constitutional claims. 253 That offers 
one reason, pre-Hawaii, for the relative success of administrative law claims. But 
the impact of Hawaii remains important and discernible. District courts have read 
Hawaii to stand for the propositions that noncitizens who have not yet entered U.S. 
territory lack constitutional rights and that the associational rights of U.S. citizens 
in this setting are subject only to the mildest form of review.254 In addition, courts 
have applied this mild review to noncitizens who have not been admitted, but who 
are physically present.25 5 Instead, courts with this tepid view of immigrants' rights 
248 Gutierrez-Soto, 317 F. Supp. 3d at 932-35; cf Michael Kagan, When Immigrants Speak: 
The Precarious Status ofNon-Citizen Speech Under the FirstAmendment, 57 B.C. L. REV. 
1237, 1268 (2016). 
249 Gutierrez-Soto, 317 F. Supp. 3d at 933. 
250 Id. at 934. 
251 Id 
252 See Metzger, supra note 106, at 484. 
253 See Jennifer Lee Koh, When Shadow Removals Collide: Searchingfor Solutions to the 
Legal Black Holes Created by ExpeditedRemoval andReinstatement, 96 WAsH. U. L. REV. 
337, 383 (2018) (describing "fluidity" of arbitrary and capricious review). 
254 See, e.g., Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 404 F. Supp. 3d 946, 951 (D. Md. 
2019) ("Notably, courts that have been asked to consider the applicable standard since Hawaii 
have read that opinion as calling for rational basis review of constitutional claims challenging 
the Proclamation, such that there is likely not 'substantial ground for difference of opinion."' 
(citations omitted)). 
255 See Gutierrez-Soto, 317 F. Supp. 3d at 931. 
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might understandably invoke reasoning more generally available when reviewing 
an agency's final action. This Part elaborates on these observations and suggests a 
direction for future exploration in litigation to protect immigrants' well-being-one 
not premised on immigrants' rights. 
A. The FirstLesson: The PrimacyofOrdinaryAdministrativeLaw Claims 
The first lesson of Hawaiiis the relative success of administrative law claims 
over constitutional claims in challenges to executive action in immigration law. Some 
of this follows from the relative strength of arbitrary and capricious review com-
pared to rational basis review. Arbitrary and capricious review requires courts to 
evaluate the process by which an agency makes a factual finding or discretionary 
decision. Specifically, it calls for setting aside action unless there is a "rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made." 2 5 Although the relation-
ship between the facts found and ultimate choice need not be particularly strong, an 
agency cannot rely on post hoc rationalizations to explain its decision. 257 This pro-
hibition on post hoc rationalizations immediately distinguishes arbitrary and capri-
cious review from rational basis review, the mildest form of constitutional scrutiny, 
and one that thrives on hypothetical governmental purposes.25 
1. Reasons for the Judicial Preference for Ordinary Administrative Law Claims 
Robust arbitrary and capricious review can serve as a meaningful check on 
agency power when an agency uses an irregular process or fails to offer a sufficient 
explanation for its action, but it does not on its own condemn substantively racist 
policies. In Judulang, as noted in Section I.B, the Court determined that the BIA had 
not adequately explained its reasons for relying on a meaningless distinction for limit-
ing a form ofdiscretionary relief for noncitizens with certain criminal convictions.25 
A similarly robust version of arbitrary and capricious review applied in Department 
ofHomelandSecurity v. Regents ofthe University ofCalifornia,discussed in Part 
III below.260 There, the Court ruled that DHS had failed to consider "important aspects 
ofthe problem" when rescinding DACA.261 It had assumed without explanation that 
both the work authorization and forbearance from deportation elements of DACA 
should be rescinded to cure the purported illegality ofonly the former.262 Procedural 
256 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29,43 (1983) (quoting 
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). 
257 Id at 50. 
258 See Steve Sanders, MakingIt Up:LessonsforEqualProtectionDoctrinefromthe Use and 
Abuse ofHypothesizedPurposesin MarriageEqualityLitigation,68 HASTINGS L.J. 657,659 
(2017). 
259 See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text. 
260 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1901 (2020). 
261 Id at 1912. 
262 Id 
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irregularities also dominated the analysis in the TPS litigation at the district court 
level.263 Except for the NAACP, plaintiffs in the TPS litigation raised both constitut-
ional and APA claims, with both sets of claims emanating from what plaintiffs de-
scribed as the racist decision-making that plagued the TPS re-designation process.264 
Judges mightprefer to issue a ruling favorable to immigrants on administrative law 
grounds rather than constitutional law grounds for several reasons. Professor Geoffrey 
Heeren has noted that this approach allows judges to avoid intervening in an unsettled 
65 area of the law, namely, immigrants' rights.2 In addition, basing a decision on 
ordinary administrative law errors permits judges to preserve a narrow institutional 
role, to judge only the process rather than the substantive ends an agency chooses. To 
brand an agency's decision or policy a violation ofequal protection on a vast record 
of explicit animus, ajudge would essentially have to condemn the policy itself. This 
would involve straying from a purely procedural critique, even though engaging in 
66 substantive analysis is the court's job when confronted with a constitutional claim.2 
Relatedly, judges might imagine a more straightforward remedy to an APA 
violation compared to a constitutional one. On remand, the agency must go back and 
weigh all the relevant considerations, and no irrelevant considerations, before 
devising a policy.267 In contrast, the remedy for an equal protection violation is more 
fraught. What would the cure to a racist decision-making process look like? How 
long after the President's utterance of hateful rhetoric, if ever, would the agency be 
permitted to end TPS for maligned immigrants of color? These types of questions 
plagued plaintiffs in Hawaiias well.268 In the end, the Court dodged those issues by 
ignoring the record of animus altogether. 269 For these reasons, courts may prefer to 
resolve disputes on ordinary administrative law grounds. 
The litigation over the rescission ofDACA illustrates the first lesson of Hawaii, 
even though none of the Justices cited Hawaiiin their opinions resolving the case. 
DACA was an Obama-era program that shielded certain noncitizens from deporta-
tion temporarily and provided them with work authorization.270 The Trump Admin-
istration rescinded DACA in 2017 based on the then-Attorney General's view that 
DACA was illegal from its inception.271 Plaintiffs challenged the rescission in multiple 
263 Id at 1926-27. 
264 See id at 1919-35. 
265 Heeren, supranote 11, at 398. 
266 See generallyGeorge Bach, Answering the "SeriousConstitutionalQuestion":Ensuring 
MeaningfulReview ofAll ConstitutionalClaims, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 177 (2014). 
267 See Vidal v. Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 420-21, 431-33 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), vacated 
sub nom. Regents, 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020). 
268 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 48-52, 54, 56-58, 60, 62-73, Trump v. Hawaii, 
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965). 
269 See Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2392-93, 2417-18. 
270 Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1901-02, 1918. 
271 Press Release, Elaine Duke, Acting Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Rescission of 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) (Sept. 5, 2017). 
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lawsuits filed across the country, asserting claims under the APA and the Equal 
Protection Clause.272 District courts permitted lawsuits to move forward onboth sets 
of claims.273 The Supreme Court ruled in the October 2019 term that the rescission 
"was arbitrary and capricious" under the APA 274 but that plaintiffs had not ade-
quately pled an equal protection claim based on Trump's anti-Mexican animus.275 
With respect to the APA claims, the Court reasoned that Acting DHS Secretary 
Elaine Duke's 2017 rescission memorandum cited one, and only one, reason for 
rescission the Attorney General's view that DACA was illegal. 276 A subsequent 
memorandum issued by Duke's successor, Acting Secretary Kirsten Nielsen, could 
not be considered because it constituted a post hoc rationalization for Duke's de-
cision.277 Accordingly, the Court considered only Duke's memorandum and found 
the justification for her policy choice lacking.278 Under the APA, an agency has 
discretion to make policy choices, but it must explain its reasoning adequately. 279 
Citing State Farm, the Court further reasoned that an agency's decision is 
arbitrary and capricious if it "failed to consider . .. important aspect[s] ofthe prob-
lem." 280 Here, Duke was bound to accept the Attorney General's view that DACA 
was illegal but that did not compel rescission.21 Rather, the source ofthe illegality, 
on the Attorney General's view, was the granting ofwork authorization and similar 
benefits, not forbearance from deportation.2 2 As a result, the Court reasoned, Duke 
should have at least consideredecoupling benefits from forbearance; having not 
even considered it, let alone explained why it was insufficient to meet the agency's 
goals, Duke's decision was arbitrary and capricious. 283 
Apart from her failure to consider an "important aspect of the problem" with re-
spect to DACA's purported illegality, Duke further failed to consider DACA recipients' 
reliance interests. 2 4 The Court conceded that those interests might not be particu-
larly strong, given that DACA recipients were informed that the program could be 
272 See Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1903; NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209, 215, 246 
(D.D.C. 2018); Vidal, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 407. 
273 Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1901-02, 1906-07, 1915-16; NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 
3d at 215-16, 246; Vidal, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 407, 409, 438. 
274 Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1912, 1915. 
275 Id at 1906, 1915-16. The Court first held, as a threshold matter, that it hadjurisdiction 
to review the challenge to the rescission. 
276 Id at 1903-04. 
277 Id at 1908-09. 
278 Id at 1908-1. 
279 Id at 1905, 1907-11, 1913, 1915. 
280 Id at 1910-12, 1915 (alteration in original) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
281 Id at 1910-13, 1915. 
282 Id at 1910-12. 
283 Id at 1910-13, 1915. 
284 Id at 1913-14 (quoting State Farm,463 U.S. at 43). 
803 2021 ] THE EMERGING LESSONS OF TRUMP V. HAWAII 
canceled at any time. 285 But regardless, many DACA recipients enrolled in higher 
education, married their partners, and bought homes in reliance on DACA, and the 
complete failure to consider those interests further undermined Duke's reasoning. 286 
In contrast to its receptivity to plaintiffs' APA claim, the Court dismissed 
plaintiffs' equal protection claim. 287 A plurality of Justices concluded that plaintiffs 
had not adequately pled an equal protection claim, despite the President's campaign 
rhetoric maligning Mexican immigrants, which is disproportionately the country of 
origin for DACA recipients. 28 The Justices declined to decide the proper analytic 
framework for this claim, but they ruled that even ifArlingtonHeights supplied the 
correct framework, plaintiffs had not adequately pled a violation of equal pro-
tection.289 First, most unauthorized immigrants are Latino; thus, "one would expect 
them to make up an outsized share of recipients of any cross-cutting immigration 
relief program."2 9 0 In addition, the Court did not recognize any irregularity in the 
rescission process.291 Finally, the Court deemed Trump's animus "unilluminating" 
because Acting Secretary Duke and the Attorney General, rather than Trump, were 
the "relevant actors."29 2 Contesting each of these conclusions, only Justice Sotomayor 
was convinced that plaintiffs had adequately pled that Trump's campaign rhetoric 
constituted circumstantial evidence to show that racial animus motivated the 
rescission of DACA.293 The Court's DACA decision illustrates the relative success 
of administrative law claims over constitutional ones, even for immigrants present 
on U.S. soil.29 4 Although no Justice cited Hawaii, attorneys involved in the case 
attributed the failure of the equal protection claim in part to a skepticism of immi-
grants' rights evinced in Hawaii.295 
285 Id 
286 See id. at 1914-15. 
287 Id at 1915-16. 
288 See id. at 1915-17. 
289 Id at 1915-16. 
290 Id at 1915. 
291 Id at 1916. 
292 Id Federal courts of appeal have taken note of the DACA majority's skepticism of 
immigrants' equal protection claims. In Ramos II, described above in the discussion of TPS 
litigation, the Ninth Circuit dismissed plaintiffs' equal protection claim, citing Regents. 975 
F.3d 872, 898 (9th Cir. 2020). 
293 Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1916-18. 
294 See FrequentlyAsked Questions: DHS DACA FAQs, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. 
SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-of-deferred-action-for-childhood 
-arrivals-daca/frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/9SPA-3K6D] (Feb. 4, 2021) 
(noting that DACA recipients do not accrue unlawful presence while their removal has been 
deferred, but DACA does not confer lawful status). 
295 Amicus, Blockbusters: DACA and Title VII, SLATE, at 23:10-26:47 (June 20, 2020, 
6:00 AM), https://slate.com/podcasts/amicus/2020/06/trump-bad-week-supreme-court [https:// 
perma.cc/5C59-L2WE]. 
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2. Implications of the Preference for Ordinary Administrative Law Claims 
Courts' preference for administrative law claims bears ome relationship to the 
phenomenon identified by Professor Hiroshi Motomura of "phantom constitutional 
norms" driving statutory interpretation in immigration law. 296 Thirty years ago, 
Professor Motomura discerned the influence of"phantom norms" 297 on federal court 
decisions in challenges to federal immigration statutes. In these cases, courts typically 
faced a choice between openly deciding the constitutional question, which meant 
following the plenary power doctrine and applying only the mildest scrutiny if 
any to an immigration statute with harmful consequences for immigrants and 
interpreting the statute in an immigrant-friendly way.298 Professor Motomura noted 
that the resort to phantom norms stunted the development of immigrants' rights 
jurisprudence but perhaps constituted a second-best solution in the shadows ofthe 
plenary power doctrine.299 
The use of phantom norms, however, differs from the constitutional avoidance 
canon. That canon describes "a presumption that Congress does not intend to enact 
unconstitutional legislation." 300 When faced with one interpretation that would 
render a statutory provision unconstitutional and an equally plausible one that would 
not, the court has the authority to choose the interpretation that does notpresent the 
constitutional question.301 This avoids invalidating a congressional enactment by 
assuming that Congress would not have intended to violate the Constitution.302 The 
constitutional avoidance canon leads courts to protect potential constitutional interests 
without expressly deciding their contours. 303 In contrast, under phantom norms, the 
court reaches a decision contraryto what it would have reached had it followed the 
plenary power doctrine.304 As a result, under the phantom norms framework, the 
court avoids a result that would harm immigrants' interests under constitutional law by 
instead opting to interpret a statute in a manner that protects immigrants' interests. 
296 See Hiroshi Motomura, ImmigrationLawAfter a CenturyofPlenaryPower: Phantom 
ConstitutionalNorms andStatutory Interpretation,100 YALE L.J. 545, 549 (1990). 
297 Id at 564-65. 
298 See id at 547-48. 
299 See id at 564-67. 
300 WILLIAMN. ESKRIDGE, JR., ABBE R.GLUCK &VICTORIA F.NOURSE, STATUTES, REGULA-
TION, AND INTERPRETATION: LEGISLATIONAND ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 
512 (2014). 
301 Id 
302 See id 
303 The alternative would be to protect constitutional interests through an expressly 
constitutional ruling that invalidates the statute in question. 
304 Motomura, supra note 296, at 564-65. Motomura argues that the use of phantom 
norms has stunted the development of jurisprudence on important questions, such as the 
extent to which analytic frameworks from mainstream public law apply to immigration cases. 
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This era of phantom norms driving sub-constitutional decisions to the benefit 
ofimmigrants appears to have ended with decisions such as Jenningsv. Rodriguez05 
and Hawaii.'O In Jennings, the Supreme Court declined to invoke the canon of 
constitutional avoidance to require bond hearings for certain detained noncitizens.307 
Similarly, inHawaii,the Court rejected statutory arguments and decided the Estab-
lishment Clause question to plaintiffs' detriment.308 As evidenced by these decisions, 
greater openness in the adjudication of immigrants' rights has not been favorable to 
immigrants. 
Recent cases' deviation from the classic "phantom norm" cases serves as further 
evidence that the "phantom norms" era has ended. Rather than "avoiding" deciding 
constitutional questions, courts in the cases urveyed above take pains to articulate 
a restrictive conception ofimmigrants' rights, one frequently upheld by the Supreme 
Court.309 Ultimately, the preference for administrative law claims has contributed to 
a crabbed vision ofimmigrants' rights by enabling courts to criticize agency process 
while remaining silent on racial and religious discrimination. 
B. The SecondLesson: GraduatedConstitutionalProtectionforNoncitizens 
Hawaiiand its progeny also reveal that immigrants enjoy "graduated constitu-
tional protections," a phrase used by Professor David A. Martin to denote the varying 
constitutional protection noncitizens enjoy based on their ties to the U.S., duration 
3 1ofresidence, and legal status. 0 The district court decisions applying Hawaiireveal 
a hierarchy among noncitizens, with those lawfully admitted into the U.S. and with 
substantial ties to the U.S. at the top, and those outside of U.S. territory at the 
bottom.311 In between, courts draw lines based on formal admission.3 12 Recent cases 
have also evinced this "positivis[t]" turn, emphasizing legal status.313 
The only class of cases discussed above in which immigrants routinely succeeded 
in advancing constitutional claims at the district court level involved challenges to 
the rescission of TPS. Immigrants with TPS have been formally admitted and are 
lawfully present on U.S. soil. In contrast, courts applied only the mildest scrutiny 
to claims brought by noncitizens who were not present on U.S. soil, as in challenges 
314 to the travel ban and its waiver procedure and the S.A. humanitarian parole case. 
305 See 138 S. Ct. 830, 836 (2018). 
306 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2392-93 (2018). 
307 Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 836. 
308 Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2392-93, 2407-08, 2422-23. 
309 See generally id.; Jennings, 138 S. Ct. 830. 
310 See Martin, supranote 243, at 48-49, 84-85, 89, 137. 
311 See, e.g., Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280, 367-68 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). 
312 See, e.g., Yafai v. Pompeo, 924 F.3d 969, 973-74 (7th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (explain-
ing that denial of a visa does not require reasoning). 
313 See Martin, supranote 243, at 97-99; see also, e.g., Saget, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 367-68. 
314 See, e.g., S.A. v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1091-92 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
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This mild scrutiny applied also to claims brought by those who were present, but who 
had not yet been admitted, as in Gutierrez-Soto. 15 With the Court's recent decision 
in Thuraisiggiamas well, where the Court deemed an asylum seeker who had crossed 
31 into the U.S. without having been admitted lacking a right to due process, 6 the role 
of formal admission in determining constitutional status has only grown.3 17 
Uncertainty surrounding immigrants' constitutional rights partly drove the 
phenomenon of"phantom norms" discussed above.318 But with greater openness in 
adjudication producing more anti-immigrant rulings, the uncertainty has yielded to 
a new doctrinal landscape, one in which most noncitizens are weak rights-holders, 
at least with respect to the First Amendment and the equal protection guarantee 
implicit in the Fifth Amendment. 319 For any noncitizen who is not or who never has 
been a legal permanent resident, or formally admitted into some other status, the Bill 
of Rights now offers very little. 
Other avenues for vindicating immigrants' interests and promoting their well-
being merit consideration. Traditional administrative law claims offer some hope, 
as evidenced in the DACA, humanitarian parole, and waiver litigation.3 2 0 But an 
APA victory does not condemn bigotry the way an equal protection victory would, 
if at all.321 In addition, as Professor Heeren has argued, ordinary administrative law 
victories offer mild and mercurial protection.3 2 2 They make immigrants' interests 
more a matter of executive whim, for an immigrant-protective policy and an anti-
immigrant policy can each be arbitrary and capricious.3 23 As a result, APA claims 
may prove insufficiently protective of immigrants' interests. 
As immigrants' constitutional claims receive mild oruneven scrutiny, advocates 
might consider a renewed focus on citizens' interests. Currently, citizens' right to 
315 See, e.g., Gutierrez-Soto v. Sessions, 317 F. Supp. 3d 917, 927-30, 932-33 (W.D. Tex. 
2018). 
316 Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1964 (2020) (holding that a 
noncitizen had "no entitlement to procedural rights other than those afforded by statute" when 
he "attempted to enter the country illegally and was apprehended just 25 yards from the border"). 
317 With respect to DACA recipients, many of whom had been admitted at some point in 
their childhood, the Court appeared to view Arlington Heights as the proper framework, thus 
suggesting that traditional equal protection review would apply, even if plaintiffs' equal pro-
tection claim failed in that particular case. Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. 
of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1914-16 (2020). 
318 See Motomura, supranote 296, at 549. 
319 This raises a more general problem, one recently explicated by Hiroshi Motomura, 
with reliance on a civil rights lens to confront the big questions of migration today. Hiroshi 
Motomura, The New MigrationLaw: Migrants, Refugees, andCitizens in an Anxious Age, 105 
CORNELL L. REV. 457, 458-60, 464-66, 471 (2020). 
320 See supra Part II. 
321 Sinnar & Srikantiah, supranote 80, at 206-07. 
322 See Heeren, supranote 11, at 418. 
323 See id at 426. 
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associate with noncitizens located outside U.S. territory is protected weakly.3 24 But 
the freedom ofassociation is underappreciated and underdeveloped in many domains, 
including immigration law. Scholars and advocates might consider developing argu-
ments rooted in the freedom of association as well as citizens' substantive due process 
rights of U.S. citizens to cohabit with noncitizen family members. At least a few 
Justices and federal judges endorsed this sort of argument in Kerry v. Din.3 25 Such 
an approach also coheres with trends in international law and human rights law.3 26 
Straying from a civil rights framework, immigrants' rights advocates might also 
explore structural constitutional claims, such as a claim arising under the Take Care 
Clause of Article II.327 Complete development of this idea is beyond the scope of 
this Article, and the justiciability of such a claim is unclear, but a few key points 
merit discussion. At he most basic level, the Take Care Clause imposes on the 
President a duty to "take Care that the laws be faithfully executed."3 2 On one view 
of this duty, the duty to faithfully execute the laws implies a duty of good faith, 
which the President violates when he acts out of racial animus.329 Under this ap-
proach, even if a person subjected to a presidential order lacks equal protection 
rights, the Constitution imposes a structural constraint on the President nonetheless. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article assesses the emerging lessons of Trump v. Hawaiiand concludes that 
the decision has dampened plaintiffs' success in litigating constitutional claims in 
a range of challenges to executive action in immigration law even for immigrants 
324 See Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 
373, 391-92 (2004). 
325 See 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141-42 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing freedom of 
association as a liberty interest with procedural due process protections); Din v. Kerry, 718 
F.3d 856, 868 (9th Cir. 2013), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2128. 
326 See Annalisa Ciampi (Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful 
Assembly and of Association), Rights to FreedomofPeacefulAssembly andofAssociation, 
5-6, 8, 12, 14, 18, U.N. Doc. A/72/150 (July 14, 2017) (arguing for freedom of association 
to be considered a fundamental human right); Edison Lanza (Special Rapporteur for Freedom 
of Expression on the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights), Protestand Human 
Rights: Standardson the Rights Involved in SocialProtestandthe Obligationto Guide the 
Response ofthe State, 11-13, 16, 48, 70, 79, OEA/Ser.L/V/II (September 2019) (discussing 
the importance of freedom of association when applied to protests). 
327 See Evan D. Bernick, Faithful Execution: Where Administrative Law Meets the 
Constitution, 108 GEO. L.J. 1, 1, 4-5 (2019). 
328 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
329 See Bernick, supranote 327, at 53 ("Not every deviation from perfect enforcement of 
the laws is constitutionally problematic. But both individualized nonenforcement decisions 
and general non-enforcement policies must be based on contextually legitimate reasons, rather 
than favoritism, animus, or policy disagreement with a statute that the President does not deem 
constitutionally objectionable."). 
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present within U.S. territory and in cases not implicating national security interests. 
For reasons that predate Hawaii,courts tend to privilege administrative law claims 
over constitutional ones in immigration law. But Hawaiihas intensified that trend 
by calling into question immigrants' constitutional status and courts' capacity to 
remedy equal protection violations in an area where the government ypically enjoys 
wide latitude.33 OIn addition, district courts interpreting Hawaiiappear to be imple-
menting the idea of graduated constitutional protection for noncitizens, but hewing 
too closely to formal distinctions. This dim view of immigrants' rights ignores the 
substantial harm that citizens suffer, even when noncitizens lack robust rights. It also 
overlooks potential structural constitutional violations. Both avenues deserve greater 
attention in the years ahead. 
See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522-24 (2003). 330 
